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During 1997 Bulgaria has experienced one of the most deep 
financial crises in CEE countries. The combination with currency crisis, 
widespread bank failures, hyperinflation and government crisis has a very 
negative affect over the whole Bulgarian economy. Parallel with the 
introduction of currency board, as part of measures for improvement of 
bank system soundness and public confidence has been enact a law for 
deposit insurance. In this paper are discussed base principles for deposit 
insurance system design and Bulgarian deposit insurance system is 




The deposit insurance system is usually introduced as a subsequent 
measure for increase of bank system confidence after systemic problem 
such as: confidence decrease, mass deposit withdraws, bank failures, 
bank crises, and very rarely as preventive measure. Typical evidence for 
this is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in USA, which is 
established after bank-runs in 1930-s
1. The Law of state protection on 
deposits and accounts, held in commercial banks, for which Bulgarian 
National Bank is required starting of bankruptcy procedure, passed in 
1996, also is one of the measures for 1996-97 bank crisis resolving. 
Although the occur stabilization in the Bulgarian banking sector, and the 
aptitude to forget the past banking crisis, the author is put the questions as 
“Is accepted deposit insurance system in Bulgaria is accordance with the 
best practices in this aria?”, and “What is the need to change it?”.  
 
 
                                            
1 http://www.fdic.gov/about/index.html  Deposit Insurance System Design  
 
The deposit insurance is one of measures, accepted to limit the 
bank crisis consequences and/or bank sector restructuring. It main aim is 
to increase the confidence in banking system, to limit the bank runs 
scope, as well as to take part of restructuring cost, including 
reimbursement of depositors’ compensation. 
The design of the deposit insurance system is of particularly 
importance for its future effectiveness. The first steps in this direction are: 
public policy objectives define, and situational analysis making. Through 
defining of public policy objectives, the policymakers must clearly define 
what are aims of the deposit insurance system, which will be developed. 
The main objectives are maintained of confidence in the bank system and 
protected less-financially-sophisticated depositors, but there may be 
includes also such as: increasing of market disciplines, reducing of moral 
hazard, etc. 
When the situational analysis is conducted, the policymakers have 
to take into account all country-specific factors, which must find 
reflection at deposit insurance system design or actualization. The 
analysis has to stress on economic factors, the state and structure of the 
banking system, public attitudes and expectations, the state of legal, prudential regulatory, supervisory, accounting and disclosure regimes, 
etc.  
The results of the situational analysis must be reflected in deposit 
insurance system design. In this phase, the attention must be directed to 
questions, connected with the mandate, powers and structure of the 
deposit insurance system, as well as features such as membership, 
coverage, funding, etc.  
A mandate is a set of official instructions or statement of purpose, 
whereby is determined the role of deposit insurance in safety net 
framework. The existing practices range from narrow, “paybox” systems 
to systems with broader power and responsibilities. The choice of the 
mandate must be correspondent to objectives, powers and responsibilities, 
given to the deposit insurer. 
Other question to be answered is “Which institution will be execute 
the deposit insurer functions?”. It is possible to be created separated 
department at some existing entity, such as Central bank for examples, or 
to be established a completely new authority. In the first case, advantages 
are connected with usage of resources and skilled staff from the main 
organization, but potential problems with separating “deposit insurance” 
function from others functions and responsibilities are main 
disadvantages.  Regardless of organization solution, the governing body of the 
deposit insurance system should include individuals with the requisite 
knowledge and which have the authority to make decisions, connected 
with organization’s activities.  Very important is the guarantee of legal 
protection on the employees against lawsuits for their actions, taken in 
good faith. The lack of such guarantee will reduce incentives to be 
watchfulness, particularly in connection with early detection, intervention 
and closure of trouble banks cases. 
It is also very important for effectiveness of deposit insurance 
system is the closely connection, coordination and cooperation with 
others participants in safety net. When all safety net functions are 
concentrated in a single organization, then coordination, information 
exchange and emerging problems are resolved between the departments 
in the organization. But in the case when safety net functions are 
separated between different organizations, issues related with information 
sharing, allocation of powers and responsibilities, as well as coordination 
between participants, must be clearly and explicitly defined. 
In general, the membership in deposit insurance system must be 
compulsory, although voluntary membership is possible too. The 
disadvantages of the second one is connected with the fact, that banks 
may do not have enough incentives to be part of the system, or they are 
too strong, and then they may to opt out. In this case, the positive effects of the existing deposit insurance system will be limited or totally 
eliminated. 
Other aspect of the banks’ membership is connected with the way 
of which they are granted to the system. The possibility resolutions are 
automatic membership and requiring banks to apply for entry. The choice 
depends of factors such as: whether deposit insurance system is 
introduced at first or it is in process of reforms; current economic 
conditions – economic growth or financial crisis; banking sector 
structure, etc. The chosen approach must contribute to achievement of 
deposit insurance system objectives. 
Essential role for the effectiveness of the system plays its score and 
level. For determination of its score is important to exist clearly definition 
(by law for examples) of “insurance deposit”. In the range of insurance 
deposits usually are included deposits held by private depositors, because 
the lawmakers have assumption that those depositors do not have 
knowledge for assessment on financial condition in banks, as well as they 
do not have enough powers for affect influence into conducted from 
banks policy. As consequences, many deposit insurance systems excluded 
deposits, held by depositors, which are deemed capable of ascertaining 
the financial condition of a bank and exerting market discipline (banks, 
government bodies, professional investors, bank directors and officers, 
auditors, etc). As next step, the policymakers must set the level of coverage on 
the base of statistical data assessment, as selected level must be credible 
and internally consistent with other design features. The limits may be 
applied per deposit or per depositors, as well as per bank or across all 
member banks. Each of the mentioned approaches has some advantages 
and disadvantages, and must be appropriate to the country specifics and 
the time of deposit insurance introduction. The most used approach is per 
depositors and per bank. 
The usage of coinsurance also promotes market discipline, reduces 
moral hazard and cost of failure resolution. Unfortunately, this approach 
has some negative consequences, connected with depositors opt out of the 
banking system. To avoid this deposit insurer may apply a limit, behind it 
the coinsurance will be applied. In this way, the depositors, which are 
holding small account balances are protected fully against the risk of lost, 
while others still have incentives to monitor financial conditions of banks. 
The decision, whether will be protected deposits, denominated in 
foreign currency depends on the degree of its usage in the country. If a 
deposit insurance system protected only deposits in domestic currency in 
a country with high usage of foreign currency, then it will be 
inappropriateness and will not achieve its objectives. 
The question “How will be funded the deposit insurance system?” 
is critical for its effectiveness, because an inadequate funding may lead to delay of failure bank problems resolving, to increase of costs, as well as 
lost of confidence in deposit insurance system. The funding may be 
ensured by levies or premiums from members, government 
appropriations, market borrowing, or a combination of them.  
The levies or premiums can be assessed on  “ex-antre” or “ex-post” 
basis. The advantage of the ex-antre  funding is the possibility of 
accumulation of a fund, as well as the smooth premium payments over 
time. Because all banks contribute to fund formation, the fail banks also 
pay a part of costs of there failures. 
Ex-post funding requires all members to pay levies or premiums 
after a bank failure. Although this funding contribute to increase of 
interbank monitoring, it has some disadvantages – the failed bank do not 
participate at costs covering, and in this way, the bank management do 
not has incentives for effectiveness governance. Furthermore, if give an 
account of that bank failures usually are connected with problems in 
banking sector, then accumulation of necessary funds may be strongly 
embarrassed or in some cases even impossible, as well as it may to lead 
similar problems in other troubled banks. 
When is establish a deposit insurance fund, two approaches may be 
applied: assessment of steady premium rate over a long period; and 
adjusting of the premium rate, according the target level and current status of the fund. The usage of second one may lead de facto to ex-post 
system, when the fund achieves the target level.  
In additional, is very important to choice between usage of a flat-
rate or the risk-adjusted differential premium system. The main advantage 
of the first one is the relative ease with which assessments can be 
calculated and administrated, but in this case, low-risk banks pay part of 
benefits received by high-risk banks. The systems with risk-adjusted 
premium may contribute usage of prudential risk-management practices, 
but in other cases they may worse financial condition on the troubled 
banks additionally, as well as to engage failures of these banks.  
 
 The Deposit Insurance in Bulgaria – problems and solutions 
 
The deposit insurance issues become actuality in Bulgaria with the 
start of transition processes from central-planed to market-based 
economy. During the socialism all banks were 100% state-owned, bank 
failures had been impossible and depositors held explicit blanket state 
guarantee. Bulgaria did not have functional deposit insurance system up 
to 1996. It has been introduced as a measure for bank problems resolution 
and for maintain of depositors’ confidence in Bulgarian banking system
2. 
The deep system bank problems in 1995-97 force policy- and law-
makers to introduce 100% guaranties for all inhabitants’ net deposits and 
50% for firms’ net deposits, independently of currency’s denomination. 
Out of protection scheme stays financial institutions, bank directors, 
managers, owners and shareholders, as well as for some close relatives. 
With the same law the Guarantee Fund, funded by long-term guarantee 
state securities issue, privatization incomes, as well as bankrupted banks’ 
liquidation, has been established. 
After the bank crisis, as measures for increase confidence in 
banking system, in 1998 has been abrogated the Law of a state protection 
on deposits and accounts, held in commercial banks, for which Bulgarian 
National Bank is required starting of bankruptcy procedure, and has been 
                                            
2 Law of a state protection on deposits and accounts, held in commercial banks, for which Bulgarian 
National Bank is required starting of bankruptcy procedure, State Gazette, No. 46, Sofia, 1996  replaced with a fully new Law for guarantee citizens’ deposits, held in 
banks
3. The new law settles the scope and coverage of deposit insurance 
system, Deposit Insurance Fund establishment, as well as statute, aims, 
management, funding and usage of the accumulated amounts in the Fund. 
The Law specifies explicit deposit insurance system with 
compulsory membership for all domestic banks and for all foreign banks, 
in which home country does not exist deposit insurance systems. The 
level of coverage is based per depositors and per bank, independently of 
currency denomination. At the first, the coverage was up to 5000 BGN
4 - 
95% of all deposits up to 2000 BGN and 80% for surplus up to 5000 
BGN. As part of the negotiations for EU accessing, the coverage has been 
updated to 100% of all deposits up to 10000 BGN in 2001 and to 100% 
of all deposits up to 15000 BGN in 2002.  
As measure to reduce the moral hazard, existing deposit insurance 
system excludes deposits, held by individuals or organization, which are 
deemed capable of ascertaining the financial condition of a bank and 
exerting market discipline, or are conducting to banks’ troubles or failure. 
In this category are included: persons, who uses privilege interest rates; 
shareholders with more than 5% of all vote; members of governing and 
supervision bodies; auditors’ bank; financial institutions; insurers; 
                                            
3 Law for guarantee citizens’ deposits, held in banks, State Gazette, No. 49, Sofia, 1998  
4 1 EUR = 1.95583 BGN pension, insurer and investments funds; the state and state authorities; 




Although Bulgarian deposit insurance system is introduces 
relatively late (1996-1998), it achieves its main aims – to increase the 
public confidence in the bank system after 1996-97 crisis. Together with 
the others macro economic stabilization measures, and the Currency 
Board introduction in particularly, the deposit insurance system 
contributes to rapidly rehabilitation and normal functioning of banking 
system after 1997.  
After the crisis overcome and macro economic stabilization occurs, 
the Bulgarian deposit insurance system has been changed in 1998. The 
usage of coverage limit and coinsurance, as well as enforcement of a 
affiliation fees (1% of bank capital, but not less than 100000 BGN) and 
yearly premiums (0,5% of deposit base of the past year), contribute for a 
deposit insurance fund building, which is able to cope with the aims of 
deposit insurance.  
In conclusion, we may generalize that existing deposit insurance 
system in Bulgaria is designed and developed according the best 
practices, and does not have need or reasons to change their fundamentals 
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